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Abstract
The etDard of the zozz World Cup football to Qatar is highly
contr ou er sial b ecaus e of the human and lab our rig ht s infring ements
due to the Kafala-system. The argument in this contribufion is
though that it has also brought something good, namely it created
the momentum for change, in particuler, to abolish the Kafala-
system. It is dfficult to enforce such change through judicial
reuiew, as is i//ustrated by the case FIrfly' c.s. us FIFA. Soft law
procedures, on the other hand, which are based on dialogue, trust
and commitment are able to set changes in motions, which is
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illustrated bg the Art. z6 complaint initiated by twelue delegates
of the ILO against Qatar and the Specific Instance with the Su.tiss
NCP initiated by BWI ag ainst FIFA. This contribution describes the
consequences of the Kafala-system, explains why FIFA also fuIfils
a role in thfs, euen though it concerns the law of the souereign State
Qatar, describes three cases addressing the poor circumstances of
the migrant workers in Qatar, and concludes thatfor these kind of
sdfuahons soft law proactiue processes may be more effectiue than
hard law retrospectiue judicial reuiew,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The zozz World Cup for football will take place in Qatar. Eyes
from all over the world will then be on Qatar. However, there are many
reasons why our eyes are already turned to Qatar ever since FIFA
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awarded the zozz World Cup to Qatar. Firstly, the decision of FIFA
to grant the zozz World Cup to Qatar is surrounded by allegations of
corruption.' Secondly, like all Arabic states, Qatar uses the so called
"Kafala system" to control migrant workers. The Kafala system is much
disputed because it leads to modern slavery.s As there are migrant
workers who work at the zozz World Cup construction sites concerns
have been raised about their working conditions. This seems right as the
zozz World Cup has been called the most deadly ever. While the sixty
fatal accidents connected to the Olympic Games in Sochi was already
extreme, compared to two fatal accidents for the zoro World Cup in
South Africa, one for the zorz Olympics in London and ten for the zor4
World Cup in Brazil, the r zoo reported deaths in Qatar are simply
outrageous.a How many worker fatalities have actually taken place at
the zozz World Cup constructions sides is unclear. Firstly it is very
difficult to get this information, and secondly, the information that is
gained, is distorted since many of the deaths are not investigated, often
because they are attributed to natural causes, such as cardiac arrest or
respiratory failure, while in fact these "natural causes" are the result of
for example dehydration or heat stress.s
This contribution focuses on this last issue, the Kafala system, and
takes the stand that although FIFA's decision to award the zozz World
Cup to Qatar is highly controversial, from a labour law perspective it may
have brought something positive. In May zorT FIFA adopted a Human
Rights Policy based on the United Nations Global Compact principles
and the Ruggie Framework, which covers activities in countries hosting
" Laughland O. FIFA official took bribes to back Qatar's zozz World Cup bid,
court hears. The Guardian. r5 November 2ot7.
3 E.g.: www.migrant-rights.orglzorglo3lunderstanding-kafala-an-archaic-law-
at-cross-purposes-with-modern-development/ (accessed zz December zotT).
a Cf.: www.statista.com/chart/35o4/fifas-corruption-also-has-a-human-cost/
(accessed zz December zorT).
s Cf.: Conn D. Thousands of Qatar World Cup workers "subjected to life-
threatening heath". The Guardian. z7 September zor7. See also: www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-33or9838; Liew J. World Cup zozz: Qatar's workers are not workers,
they are slaves, and they are building mausoleums, not stadiums. The Independent.
3 October zorT; ITUC. The case against Qatar. Host of the FIFA zozz World Cup.
Special Report. March zor4.
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World Cups.6In October 2017 Qatar announced reforms to dismantle
the Kafala system.z Both initiatives have been hailed as positive changes.
The aim of this contribution is to analyse how various (quasi-)
legal initiatives and pressures have contributed to these changes.
I will first describe the Kafala system and its susceptability for forced
labour in more detail. Secondly, I will describe various (quasi-) legal
initiatives and forms of pressure put on Qatar to abolish the Kafala
system. I will also describe the pressure directed to FIFA to take its
social responsibility seriously and exert all of its influence over its
partners in Qatar, and over partners organising a World Cup more
generally. Thirdly, I will describe the two main changes these (quasi-)
legal initiatives have contributed to, i.e. the announced reforms of the
Kafala system in Qatar and FIFA's Human Rights Policy. I will conclude
with a reflection on the process towards these changes generated by
these (quasi-) legal initiatives and forms of pressure put on Qatar and
FIFA.
II. THE KAFAI-A SYSTEM
This section describes the Kafala system as a legal framework to
control migrant workers. To illustrate the consequences of this system
it also includes some examples from the practice based on stories that
have been published in various newspapers and reports.
Kafala, which means sponsorship in Arabic, is a system of control.
In the context of migrant workers in Arabic countries, among which
Qatar, it is a system in which governments have delegated oversight and
responsibility for migrant workers to private citizens and companies.s
Sponsors are given a set of legal powers to control migrant workers.
Often the sponsor is the employer of the migrant worker. This
gives the employer not only the control over how the worker has to
6 See : www.fifa. com/governance/news/y = 2oL7 I m= 6/news =fi fa-publishesland
mark-human-rights-policy-z8933rr.html, which includes a link to the policy docu-
ment (accessed z3 December zotT).
z Available at: www.ituc-csi.org/breakthrough-to-end-kafala-after (accessed
z3 December zorT).
8 See for an elaborate explanation of the Kafala system at the website of migrant-
rights.org.
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perform his duties (which is one of the core elements of the employ-
ment relationship 
- 
subordination), but also about the choice of emp-
loyment and even residence. Thus, without the permission of the
sponsor (ie employer), a worker cannot change his job, quit his job, or
leave the country. Moreover, the sponsor has the power to cancel the
residency visa of a worker who has quit his job without permission.
Such an action turns the worker automatically into an illegal resident in
the country, often giving cause to deportation proceedings that include
spending time in prison.e
In practice this commonly leads to the following situations.'o
Workers are recruited by special agencies that ask high fees, varying
between USD r ooo to USD 3 5oo. However, given the better jobs and
higher salaries, migrant workers are willing to pay such fees with the
idea that they will easily earn this back. However, it is not uncommon
that upon arrival the migrant worker is told that the contract he signed
via the recruitment agency is no longer valid and is offered another
contract with a lower wage and another job position. Since they have
to pay back the recruitment fees (and some other costs, for instance for
an orientation seminar, medical examination, and insurance) they have
no other option than accepting this new, less favourable, contract. Also
common practice is the confiscation of the passport by the sponsor,
which, besides the formal requirements such as an exit visa, makes it
more difficult to leave employment or the country.
After having accepted the changed contract, the migrant worker soon
finds out that the employment is very different from what was agreed. It
can be a completely different position, for example, instead of working
at administration in an office the migrant worker finds himself building
a football stadium or a constructing a road. It can also be that additional
work is required, for instance, in the morning it is cleaning activities at a
e Available at: www.migrant-rights.org/zor5/o3/understanding-kafala-an-
archaic-law-at-cross-purposes-with-modern-development/.
'o This is mainly based on testimonials of migrant workers included in: ITUC.
The case against Qatar. Host of the FIFA zozz World Cup. Special Report. March zo14;
and the introduction in: Liew J. World Cup zozz: Qatar's workers are not workers,
they are slaves, and they are building mausoleums, not stadiums. The Independent.
3 October zor7.
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school and in the afternoon and evening it entails hospitality services in
a hotel. Besides these unpleasant changes, the working conditions and
circumstances are often also terrible. Examples have been registered of
extremely long working hours, such as starting to work from 6 am till
12 pm in one job and then continue working from 3 pm till midnight in
the other job, leading to sleep deprivation. Although a six day working
week is respected, it is not uncommon that workers are compelled to
work a few hours on their day off. Overtime is also a regular feature
of working in Qatar. Migrant workers have indicated that they were
working double shifts of L2-r4 hours per day with only z-3 hours of
overtime being paid. Annual leave days can easily be denied with the
excuse that there is no one to replace the worker. Since the sponsor
(which most of the time is also the employer) holds the passport, the
worker cannot just take up his annual leave days. Working outdoors in
Qatar during summertime is extremely harsh because of the heat; it can
easily reach 5o degrees Celsius." An annually issued ministerial decree
stipulates that from 15 June to 3r August outdoor workers should work
no more than five hours in the morning till rr.3o am at the latest and
start the evening shift no earlier than 3 pm. However, since the decree
is legally not binding, many companies do not comply with it. Also, it
has been commented that instead of fixed dates, the rule should apply
"whenever the temperatures goes up beyond normal levels."" Salary
payments are regularly delayed, there is a lack of safety procedures and
materials, and workers are inexperienced and non-trained for the jobs
required to do. The Kafala system makes it impossible for workers to
bring any changes in their situation. Any form of complaint, comment,
or resistance is met with retaliation by their sponsor (i.e. the employer).
Workers that go on strike have been arrested, imprisoned and placed
at risk of deportation.'r
" It is also for this reason that the eozz World Cup will take place in winter
and not in summer.
" Cf.: Toumi H. Calls to implement summerworking hours in Qatar. Gulf News.
15 May zorr.
'3 ITUC. Qatar Arrests roo Striking Workers for Deportation. z6 November
2ot4.
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Additionally, many migrant workers have to share accommodation
with B-ro people, sleeping in bunkbeds, while kitchens and wash-
rooms need to be shared with many more persons. These are poor
circumstances. Sharing a small room with so many persons hardly
provides the environment for a good night's rest. Taking good care of
personal hygiene and preparing nutritious meals are also challenging
under such circumstances.
The above leads the International Trade Union Conferderation
(ITUC) to conclude that:
"fm]igrant workers have reported finding themselves in exploi-
tative situations, such as being paid far lower than promised wages,
experiencing numerous unspecified deductions from wages, not being
paid at all for months and living in abysmal living conditions with
dozens of co-workers crammed into small unventilated shelters without
proper plumbing, water and electricity."'a
These findings are not limited to the workers involved with
the construction works for the zozz World Cup. Nonetheless, these
problems affect these migrant workers especially, because since the
award of the zozz World Cup the number of migrant workers increased
considerably, some sources report up to half a million workers,'s while
others claim that the number of migrant workers has doubled.'6 Having
to provide decent working and living conditions for so many additional
workers in such a short period of time is challenging for any legal and
administrative system. For a country like Qatar which hosts most of the
migrant workers of the world; based on the Qatari 
- 
migrant workers
represent 94 o/o of the work force and these workers represent 7o % of
the total population.'z In this context it has been argued that abolishing
the Kafala system will disrupt the Qatari society too much. Qatari
'4 ITUC. The case against Qatar. Host of the FIFA zozz World Cup. Special
Report. March zor4. P. 28.
's Ibid. p. 17.
'6 Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part I: The
Claims against FIFA. Asser International Sports Law BIog. z8 February zor7.
'7 Available at: www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/zotglseplz6lqatar-
migrants-how-changed-the-country; and The Middle East's migrant workers. Forget
about rights. The Economist. ro August zor3.
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people fear that under a less strict regime migrant workers will unite,
coalesce and perhaps even mobilise against them.'8 The Kafala system
deliberately puts migrant workers under a strict control.'s However,
with the number of fatal accidents in the run up to major sports events
being the highest ever,"o many voices are raised calling the need to
abolish the Kafala system. Additionally, these worker fatalities have
also raised questions about the role of FIFA, especially in the context
of corporate social responsibility.
rrr. THE (QUAST-)LEGAL ACTIONS
AGAINST QATARAND FIFA
As indicated in the introduction the award of the zozz World Cup
to Qatar has been contested for several reasons. The extremely high
number of worker fatalities in the run up to the event as consequence
of the Kafala system proves that from a human and labour rights
perspective FIFA's decision is highly questionable: is a sports event
worth the death of so many workers? The simple answer is no. However,
still I claim that despite all this it has also brought something positive.
Before the award of the zozz World Cup the Kafala system was already
'8 Ibid.
's A much discussed case in the global football community is the case of the
French football player Zahir Belounis, whose contract as captain ofthe Qatari team El
Jaish was abruptly terminated leaving him without pay. When he brought legal actions
against his former team, El Jaish (his employer and sponsor) denied his exit visa.
Consequently, Belounis could not leave the country and kept him trapped in Qatar
for two more years without income. See more elaborately on this: Erfani A. Kicking
Away Responsibility: FIFA's Role in Response to Migrant Worker Abuses in Qatar's
zozz World Cup. Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal. 2ot5.22 (z). 6zS. Available
at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol zz I issz I .
"o For completeness sake it should be noticed that compared to other sports
events, the construction works in Qatar may rank among the most extensive, since
it is not limited to building football stadiums, but also includes building a new city
called Lusail which will include a shopping mall, zoo, schools, a hospital and housing
for over 25o ooo residents (cf.: www.huffingtonpost.comlzot4loS/25/qatars-new-
world-cup-city-n-5698r38.htm1), as well as an airport and the necessary roads to
create a connecting infrastructure between the cities and sports stadiums.
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shown to result in human trafficking and modern forms of slavery,"
however, apparently not enough pressure could be created to push
Arabic countries to abolish it since little has changed.,, The zozz World
Cup seems to have created a momentum to exert the necessary pressure
for changes in Qatar.'s
The same argument can be made with respect to the social
responsibility of FIFA as the commissioning organisation of the World
Cup event. In these times of globalisation in which multinational
companies are under pressure to undertake due diligent Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) for what is going on in the production
and value chains, it is not surprising that such pressure is also put on
transnational operating organisations like FIFA and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC). For FIFA the award of the zozz World Cup
has created the momentum in which it can no longer deny its CSR for
what happens in the event's host country in the run up to the event.
This section describes three (quasi-)legal actions, of which one
against Qatar: an Article z6 complaint with the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) and two against FIFA: a case initiated jointly by the
Dutch trade union FNV, the Bangladeshi Free Trade Union Congress, the
"' E.g.: The first document about the Kafala system within the International
Labour Organisation dates back to 2oo2. This is a working paper on migrant women
in the United Arab Emirates. In this report the vulnerability of migrant workers under
the Kafala is extensively described. When entering the word "Kafala" on the ILO's
website, it results in 236 hits. At the website of Human Rights Watch information and
reports date back lo zoo7. The title of the news release on 17 December 2oo7, "Asian
Migrant Workers Abandoned to Abuse", gives a clear indication about the vulnerability
of these workers under the Kafala system.
"' Only Bahrain abolished the Kafala system: Harmassi M. Bahrain to end
"slavery" system. BBC Arabic Service Radio. 6 May zoo9. Available at: news.bbc.
co.uk/z/hi/middle_east/8o35972.stm (accessed z3 December zorT).To what extent
Bahrain really abolished the Kafala system is disputable. Cf.:, Bahrain Moves to Reform
Kafala, Exclusions Remain. Americans for Democracy. z8 October zot6. Available at:
www.adhrb.o rg I zot6 I to lbahrainkafala/ (accessed z3 December zotT).
': The number of reports by international and non-governmental organisations
increases significantly after zoto. Also the number of organisations taking up on the
subject increases. The hearing at the European Parliament on sports and Human
Rights in Qatar is one example (discussed in section 3.2) and so is the zot4 report of
United Nation's Human Rights Council's special rapporteur Franqois Cr6peau on the
human rights of migrants in Qatar. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/SRMigrants/A-HRC-26-35-Addr_en.pdf (accessed z4 December zorT).
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Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers Federation and the Bangladeshi
citizen Nadim Shariful Alam against Qatar filed with the Commercial
Court of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland; and a specific instance filed
with the OECD national contact point of Switzerland by global trade
union federation Builders and Wood Worker's International.
r. ILO Art. z6 Complaint against Qatar on forced labour
and labour inspectorate
On rz June zo14 the Director-General of the International Labour
Conference received a communication to launch an Article z6 complaint
alleging non-observance by Qatar of the Forced Labour Convention
(No. zq) and the Labour Inspection Convention (No. 8t) submitted by
delegates from Belgium, Libya, Jordan, the United Kingdom, Denmark,
France, Canada, Pakistan, Kenya, and Tunisia.'a The complaint argues
that the problem of forced labour affects the migrant worker population
of roughly r.5 million and that the Qatari Government fails to maintain
a legal framework sufficient to protect the rights of migrant workers
consistent with international law. It raises particular concern since the
Qatari Kafala system, which is among the most restrictive of the region,
facilitates exacting forced labour making it very difficult for a migrant
worker to leave an abusive employer.'s
In its reply date z6 January 2015, the Qatari Government provided
information on measures taken to combat all forms of forced labour
and human trafficking. First of all the Government stressed that forced
labour is penalised by criminai law. Furthermore, the Government
stated that the draft law to replace the Kafala system has been explicitly
announced and that the new law is based on a contract system. The draft
law also amends the provisions relating to the so called "release permit",
which will make a government body responsible for the worker instead
"+ Governing Body, Complaint alleging non-observance by Qatar of the Forced
Labour Convention, r93o (No. z9), and the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947
(No. 8r), made by delegates to the to3'd Session (zor4) of the International Labour
Conference under article z6 of the ILO Constitution, 323'd Session, Geneva tz-27
March zot5, GB.3z3lINS/8(Rev.t).
's Ibid. P. r.
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of the employer.26 Other changes involve recruitment fees, contract
frauds, the confiscation of passports (which is already penalised by
law), and conditions and specifications for housing.'7 Regarding the
efforts used to develop the labour inspection system, the Government
emphasises that it pays great attention to the mission of labour inspection
to ensure the enforcement of laws which provide protection to workers
employed in Qatar. Thus, the number of inspectors has steadily increased
up to 294, the efficiency of the inspections has improved, and a new
department on occupational safety and health at the Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs has been established.'8 Furthermore, the Government
extensively describes existing practices and legal powers of the labour
inspectorate.'s Changes are also described and announced with respect
to the grievance mechanisms for workers. These include the establish-
ment of a team specialised in providing guidance and counselling to
workers, which also makes field visits to receive complaints. Other
measures include ensured translation, distribution of newsletters, the
launch of a hotline, accounts on social media, the establishment of an
office at the Ministry to collaborate with workers who have initiated
legal procedures against employers (including providing legal aid), and
actions to raise awareness with migrant workers about their rights.so
With respect to the issue of the protection of wages, the Government
indicates that a draft amendment of a few sections of the Labour Code
has been drawn up so as to impose dissuasive penalties on employers
who are in violation of this Code.3'
From 7-rr February 2or1 a high-level mission was undertaken
by ILO officers, under supervision of the Director of the International
Labour Standards Department.3' During the mission the ILO officers
met with various government officials and the Supreme Committee for
"6 Ibid. P
"7 Ibid. P
,8 Ibid. P
"e Ibid. P
3. Ibid. P
s' Ibid. P.
3" Ibid. P
8.
8-9.
9-10.
10-11.
t2-L4.
15.
t6.
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Delivery and Legacy (SC).se They also visited, among other locations,
the Labour Inspectorate, the construction site for Al Wakrah Stadium,
and a set of workers' accommodations near Doha.:+ The overall con-
clusion of the mission was that despite the recent measures taken by the
Qatari Government to improve the working conditions of the migrant
workers, many challenges remain. Further progress could be made,
especially concerning the timely payment of wages, the ability to change
employers and access to effective complaints mechanisms, since these
leave workers in a precarious situation.ss
Despite all the changes announced by the Qatari Government,
the Governing Body expressed its concerns about the gravity of the
issues raised in the complaint to the Officers of the Governing Body
recommending a) that a high-level tripartite mission be undertaken
to Qatar before June zor5 and b) to postpone a decision on setting
up a commission of inquiry to its 3z5th session (November zor5).s6
The decision was again postponed at the 3z5th session and the 3z8th
session (November 2ot6).sz On 3r October 2or7, at its 33r't session, the
Governing Body decided to close the complaint procedure. Instead of
monitoring via the complaint procedure, the cooperation between the
ILO and Qatar is continued in the period zor8-zozo, via a Technical
Cooperation Project and its implementation modalities.s8 It is stated
that the Technical Cooperation Project reflects the common commit-
ment of the ILO and Qatar to cooperate on ensuring compliance with
ratified international labour Conventions. This will be done through:
improvement in payment of wages; enhanced labour inspection and
OSH systems; refinement of the contractual system that replaced the
33 This is the organisation between FIFA and the government of the organising
country, i.c. the Qatari Government.
:q GB.3z3lINS/8(Rev.t). P. t7-27.
35 lbid. p. 29.
3. Ibid. P. 2.
37 Governing Body, Complaint alleging non-observance by Qatar of the Forced
Labour Convention, r93o (No. z9), and the Labour Inspection Convention, t947
(No. 8r), made by delegates to the ro3rd Session (zor4) ofthe International Labour
Conference under article z6 ofthe ILO Constitution, 33l't Session, Geneva z6 October 
-
9 November zor7, GB.33r/INS/rt(Rev.). P. t.
38 Ibid. P.3.
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kafala system and to improve labour recruitment procedures; increased
prevention, protection and prosecution against forced labour; and
promotion of the workers' voice.3e
z. Two (quasi-)legal actions against FIFA 
- 
Due Diligence
Before addressing the two (quasi-)legal actions against FIFA a few
words need to be addressed about why to bring a claim against FIFA
if the problem lies with Qatar's Kafala system. Against the background
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) it is generally accepted that
multinational enterprises influence what happens with the human and
labour rights in their value and production chains. To what extent a
multinational enterprise will be held responsible depends on how
strong its influence is. The latter depends on the relationship between
the hub company and its subsidiaries and subcontractors. The stronger
this relationship is the bigger the influence is presumed to be and the
weaker this relationship is, the smaller the influence is presumed to
be. There are different reasons why the relationship between the hub
company and its subsidiary or subcontractor is either strong or weak.
In general two main causes can be indicated: the hierarchical structure
between the two entities; and the position in the production or value
chain. The former refers to the initial power relationship between the
two entities. If the hierarchical structure is strong (meaning that the
hub company basically decides everything for the whole chain), the
influence is presumed to be strong. If the hierarchical structure is
weak, for example because the companies are related in the structure
of a network or the subcontractor is a so called "turnkey" company 
-
meaning that it also works for other hub companies in the same sector,
the influence of the hub company will be weak.qo
3, Ibid. p. 31.
+o Cf.: Gereffi G., Humphrey J., and Sturgeon T., The governance of global value
chains. Reviewoflnternational Political Economy. zoo1.rztl. Pp.78-ro4; andapplied
more specifically to the situation of labour law: ter Haar B. P. and Keune M. One step
forward or more window-dressing? A legal analysis of the recent CSR initiatives in the
garment industry in Bangladesh. The International Journal of Comparative Labour
Law & Industrial Relations. 2or4.3o:r. Pp. 5-26.
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The position of the subsidiary or subcontractor refers to how
close the contractual relationship is with the hub company, both in
terms of percentage of supplying as well as in terms of the number of
contracts between them. Thus, a subsidiary or subcontractor that is
mainly producing for the hub company is considered to be more under
the influence of the latter, than a company that also produces for other
hub companies (this also relates the hierarchical structure described
above). In production chains it is common practice that a subsidiary or
subcontractor contracts part of its activities out to another subsidiary
or subcontractor. For instance, because it has overbooked itself and in
order to make the deadlines it needs assistance by another company, or
it receives a last minute order with a very short deadline. Last minute
changes in an existing order may also result in pressure on the delivery
times forcing the company to contract out (part o0 the production. It
can also be that the product simply exists of many different components
which are assembled in different stages by different companies that
deliver (parts o0 the full product. Consequently, the line of outsourcing
from one company to another can be very long, which weakens the
relationship with the hub company every time a new contract is added
to the chain.
Within the literature of CSR this principle of what could be called
"level of influence" is part of due diligence, which refers to the manner
in which the multinational enterprise respects and conducts its CSR
policy. For example, paragraph ten of the general principles of the
OECD guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) stipulates that
MNEs are expected to:
"Carry out risk-based due diligence, for example by incorporating
it into their enterprise risk management systems, to identify, prevent
and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts as described in
paragraphs rr and 12, and account for how these impacts are addressed.
The nature and extent of due diligence depend on the circumstances of
a particular situation."a'
Paragraph tt refers to avoiding adverse impacts on human and
labour rights through the MNEs own activities and paragraph rz
4' OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, zo11 edition. Available at:
http ://mneguidelines.oecd.org/guidelines/.
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refers to prevent or mitigate an adverse impact where the MNE itself
has not contributed to the adverse impact, but when the impact is
nevertheless directly linked to the operations, products or services
by a business relationship. Paragraph 14 of the Commentary on the
General Principles further specifies that "contributing to" an adverse
impact is to be interpreted as "a substantial contribution, meaning an
activity that causes, facilitates or incentivises another entity to cause
an adverse impact and does not include minor or trivial contributions."
Furthermore, it is specified in paragraph 14 that the term "'business
relationship' includes relationships with business partners, entities
in the supply chain and any other non-State or State entities directly
linked to its business operations, products or services."
Although FIFA disputed whether the OECD Guidelines for MNEs
are applicable to an organisation like FIFA (see the specific instance with
the Swiss NCP as discussed below), pursuant to Article gZ of the FIFA
zo16 Statutes it is ciear that FIFA has an impact on the activities of the
countries hosting the World Cup, since it stipulates that "the Organising
Committee for the FIFA World Cup shall organise the FIFA World Cup
in compliance with the provisions of the regulations applicable to this
competition, the List of Requirements and the Organising Association
Agreement.'+' In principle FIFA doesn't seem to deny this in either
of the two cases discussed here. The main question addressed in both
cases though is to what extent is FIFA expected to limit its (potentially)
adverse impacts?
3. Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich,
HGr6oz61-O, 3 January zorT
The first (quasi-)legal action to be discussed in this section is
the case filed with the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich,
Switzerland (further referred to as "Court"). The case was initiated
jointly by the Dutch trade union FNV, the Bangladeshi Free Trade Union
Congress, the Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers Federation and
the Bangladeshi citizen Nadim Shariful Alam (together further referred
a' Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part I: The
Claims against FIFA. Asser International Sports Law Blog. z8 February zor7.
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to as "Plaintiffs"). The Plaintiffs submitted three claims.a3 Firstly, they
requested the Court to order FIFA to redress the ongoing human rights
violations by pressing the responsible Qatari authorities to abolish
the controversial Kafala system and to ensure that human rights and
fundamental freedoms of migrant workers are preserved. Secondly, and
alternatively, they asked the Court merely to declare the unlawfulness
of those human rights violations. Thirdly, the Bangladeshi worker
Nadim Shariful Alam sought damages of USD 4 ooo and a satisfaction
amounting to CHF 30 ooo.44
More particularly, the Plaintiffs contend that the kafala system
violates Qatari domestic law, Swiss law and international labour and
human rights law.as In particular, as Grell describes, the Plaintiffs
"argue that Qatar facilitates forced labour by: (i) the employer's control
over residency permits; (ii) prohibiting workers to switch employer;
(iii) allowing abusive contracts; (iv) allowing high recruitment fees;
(v) not effectively opposing passport confiscation; and (vi) the lack of
effective redress and legal enforcement of the protection of workers'
rights. Given that their passports are routinely being retained, migrant
workers are also constrained in their freedom of movement. Owing
to the fact that Qatari domestic law prohibits migrant workers from
organising in trade unions, their freedom of association is virtually
non-existent. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs invoke the violation of the
fundamental right not to be discriminated against and the right to an
effective remedy."46
a3 Since the court's ruling is not publicly accessible this part is based on the
descriptions provided by Thom6s Grell in his blogs on this case: FIFA's Responsibility
for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part I: The Claims against FIFA. Asser International
Sports Law Blog. z8 February zotT; and FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights
Abuses in Qatar. Part II: The Zurich Court's Ruling. Asser International Sports Law
Blog. 6 March zot7.
aa Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part II: The
Zurich Court's Ruling. Asser International Sports Law Blog. 6 March zot7.
qs Lawsuit submitted to the Court by the Plaintiffs on 8 December zo16, para.
259.
a6 Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility fot Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part I: The
Claims against FIFA. Asser International Sports Law Blog. z8 February zor7.
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To address the link between FIFA and Qatar's alleged failure
to comply with human and labour rights obligations, the Plaintiffs
refer to three sets of rules: FIFA's own rules; Swiss tort law; and
international law, in particular the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights. Pursuant to Article 3 of the FIFA zo16 Statutes
FIFA commits itself to respect all internationally recognised human
rights and to promote the protection of these rights.+z In Article 4 FIFA
2016 Statutes FIFA states that any kind of discrimination is strictly
prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion. Via Article
37 FIFA zo16 Statutes, FIFA forces the World Cup host to sign an
Organising Association Agreement which holds a list of requirements
concerning, among others, infrastructure, security, broadcasting rights,
and financing. Remarkable it lacks any demands on human and labour
rights.+e Plaintiffs interpret this stringent agreement as a "take-it-
or-leave-it" deal, claiming that FIFA exerts tremendous influence on
the host States to modify their national legislation, at least for the
duration of the World Cup.+e Furthermore, Plaintiffs refer to the power
of FIFA to exclude countries from the bidding procedure (as was done
with Indonesia) or suspend countries' membership (as was done with
Guatemala in October zo16 and Nigeria in zor4). That such actions can
also be done for reasons of human and labour rights, as was the case
with South Africa during the apartheid regime.so With these arguments
Plaintiffs aim to demonstrate the considerable influence FIFA has over
the World Cup host country when it wants.
+z Available at: resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/genericlozlTSl
z9 I o7 I fif aslatutswebe n_neutral. pdf (accessed z4 December zo r7).
a8 Cf.: Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part I:
The Claims against FIFA. Asser International Sports Law Blog. z8 February zor7,
with reference to the Organising Association Agreement with South Africa. Available
at : ccs.ukzn. ac.za/fi les/Fifa%ozo agreemenl%zovnth%zoSA%zo z. pdf (accessed z4 De-
cember zorT).
+g Plaintiffs refer in this context to the so called "Budweiser law" enacted by Brazil
to allow beer sales during the zo4 World Cup while the sale of alcohol was prohibited
in Brazilian stadiums for over ten years. Cf. Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human
Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part I: The Claims against FIFA. Asser International Sports
Law Blog. z8 February zor7.
so Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part I: The
Claims against FIFA. Asser International Sporls Law Blog. z8 February zor7.
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Swiss tort law applies by virtue of the choice of law rules laid down
in the Swiss Act on Private International Law. The core argument of
Plaintiffs is based on the principle of "endangerment". As explained by
Grell this means that a person who brings about a dangerous situation
shall take the necessary precautions in order to prevent potential
harm.5' Plaintiffs argue that FIFA's obligation under this law is triggered
because it failed to demand from Qatar to set aside the Kafala system.s'
Since FIFA communicated its commitment to abide by the UN
Guiding Principles, the Plaintiffs argue that they make a reasonable
point of reference to understand FIFA's responsibility for human
and labour rights. Additionally, FIFA asked John Ruggies3 to develop
recommendations on what it means for FIFA to embed and respect
human and labour rights across its global operations.s+ The situation of
Qatar's migrant workers is among the reasons to initiate these moves.ss
Since the Court concluded that the case could be decided
immediately, FIFA was not invited to express its views.s6 The Court
found the claims of the Plaintiffs inadmissible, since they are too
ambiguous to be enforceable. The first Claim was too vague because
it did not specify the Qatari authorities to which FIFA should turn in
order to ameliorate the humanitarian conditions for World Cup-related
migrant workers.sT In its in obiter dicta comments, the Court further
explained that the first claim is more likely to fall within the ambit of
public law (instead of commercial law), and that a decision requiring
a private association (i.e. FIFA) to interfere in domestic affairs of a
s' Ibid.
s, Ibid.
$ John Ruggie is professor at Harvard University and designed the UN Guiding
Principles and the supporting framework "Protect, Respect and Remedy".
s+ Available at: www.solidar.ch/sites/default/files/ruggie_humanrightsfifa-
reportaprilzo16.pdf (accessed z4 December zorT).
ss Ibid. P.4.
s6 Such is possible on the grounds ofthe Swiss Code ofCivil Procedure. See on
this: Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part II: The
Zurich Court's Ruling. Asser International Sports Law Blog. 6 March zot7.
;' Rulin8 of the Commercial Courl of the Canton of Zurich, HGr6oz6r-O,
3 January zot7. P.7.
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sovereign State (i.e. Qatar) could be potentially deemed unlawful.ss
The second Claim was also too vague because it did not specify which
conduct of FIFA should be declared unlawful. Consequently, it would be
impossible for FIFA to defend itself.sq The third Claim was rejected due
to the absence of a commercial dispute between Mr. Alem and FIFA.6.
As a result of the inadmissibility of the first two Claims and the
rejection of the third Claim, the Court did not get to the merits of the
question to what extent FIFA should take its responsibility for human
and labour rights infringements by the host organising its World Cup.
It did not even consider whether such an obligation rests upon FIFA.
This is different in the next case, i.e. the specific instance at the Swiss
NCP initiated by global trade union federation BWI.
4. Specific Instance regarding FIFA submitted by BWI,
r3 October 2o1S and e May zorT
On zB May zor5 the Building and Wood Worker's International
(BWI) raised a specific instance with the Swiss NCP concerning
human and labour rights violations of migrant workers related to the
construction of facilities for the FIFA zozz World Cup in Qatar.6' BWI
claims that FIFAviolated the OECD Guidelines for MNEs by appointing
Qatar as the host State for the zozz world Cup. Furthermore, BWI
claims that at the time FIFA awarded the zozz World Cup to Qatar the
human and labour rights violations were well documented and know, yet
FIFA's Bidding Agreement did not include any requirements to address
human and labour rights. Therefore, BWI argues, FIFA failed to conduct
adequate and ongoing human rights due diligence as called for in the
2011 OECD Guidelines for MNEs. More specifically, BWI argues that
FIFA was at least expected to take adequate steps "to cease or prevent
its own contribution to the human rights violations of migrant workers
s8 Grell T. FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part II:
The Zurich Court's Ruling. Asser International Sporls Law Blog. 6 March zor7.
ss Ruling of the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich, HGr6oz6r-O,
3 January zor7. P. 8.
6o Grell T. FIFA s Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar. Part II: The
Zurich Court's Ruling. Asser International Sports Law Blog. 6 March zor7.
6' NCP Switzerland, Initial Assessment. 13 October zor5. P. r.
. 
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and to use its leverage with the Government of Qatar to accelerate the
necessary labour and other reforms that would help prevent and mitigate
remaining human rights violations."6' BWI asked the Swiss NCP to offer
its good offices, firstly, to identify steps to be taken by FIFA, secondly
to address the responsibility of FIFA to use its alleged leverage with the
Government of Qatar in order to accelerate labour and other human
rights-related reforms. BWI submitted a list of topics, which can be
summarised as the development and implementation of a human and
labour rights due diligence policy based on the OECD Guidelines for
MNEs and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
including inspections, grievance mechanisms, stakeholder involvement
(including trade unions), and the use of its leverage to engage with
the Qatari Government to accelerate human and labour rights related
reforms.6s
FIFAsubmitted awritten statementto the Swiss NCP on z7 July zor5
in which it emphasised its commitment to good governance principles.
However, FIFA also believes it is important to discuss how the OECD
Guidelines for MNEs apply to FIFA, since it is an association registered
in the Commercial Register in accordance with Article 6off of the Swiss
Civil Code.6+ Furthermore FIFA stated that it is imperative that all
workers in Qatar enjoy fair and safe working conditions and to advance
that end FIFA encourages and facilitates dialogue between stakeholders
in Qatar and international organisations. Additionally FIFA provided
an overview of activities it already undertook regarding Qatar at the
highest political level, as well as of the standards and codes of conduct
FIFA adheres to. Nonetheless, FIFA also considers that the protection
of workers' rights is as an urgent and complex matter which requires
"the coherent involvement and support of all relevant stakeholders such
as, among others, enterprises having construction sites in Qatar and
the migrant workers' countries of origin."6s Therefore, FIFA believes
that the most efficient and effective approach is a continuous multi-
6, Ibid.
63 lbid. P. 2.
64 Ibid. P.3.
65 Ibid.
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stakeholder approach and confirms its commitment to dialogue and
close monitoring of the progress.
In its Initial Assessment the Swiss NCP considered the applicability
of the OECD Guidelines to the responding party. Thereto, the NCP
first reiterated the definition of the term "multinational enterprise"
as interpreted by the OECD Guidelines. The term is interpreted very
wide and includes enterprises in all sectors of the economy of which
the ownership may be private, State or mixed and which usually
also comprise companies or entities established in other countries.66
Furthermore, the NCP considers that the OECD Guidelines expressly
establish principles and standards for responsible business conduct,
which is generally understood as the responsibility of entities involved in
business or commercial activities. Whether an entity can be considered
to have commercial activities, is to be determined by the competent NCP
on a case-by-case analysis based on the concrete circumstances.6z To
understand the situation of FIFA, the NCP's next step was to ascertain
the legal construction of FIFA. FIFA is not a single legal entity, but
exists of several entities which are enlisted in the Commercial Regis-
ter of the Canton of Zurich. Additionally, FIFA owns a number of
foreign subsidiaries. Secondly, the NCP analysed what sort of activi-
ties FIFA undertakes, which it derives from the bidding contract between
FIFA and its direct counterparties in Qatar. The bidding contract is very
comprehensive and includes various topics of commercial nature, e.g.
media marketing rights, finance and insurance, etc. The conclusion of
the Swiss NCP is therefore, that since FIFA consists of different entities
active in more than one country, it has a multinational scope and since
the activities of FIFA include activities of commercial nature. the OECD
Guidelines are applicable.6s
Regarding the materiality of the specific instance, the NCP considerd
that while BWI has referenced various violations of migrant workers'
rights in Qatar, the role of individual actors according to the different
provisions of the OECD Guidelines needs to be further explored.6o
66 Ibid. P. 6
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
6e Ibid. P.7
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Therefore the NCP offered its good offices for further mediation between
BWI and FIFA in order to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. Parties
accepted this offer and after six meetings in zo16 mediated by Prof.
Christine Kaufmanzo a mutual agreement was reached which is included
in the NCP's Final Statement issued on z May zotT.In this agreement
BWI and FIFA identified five areas they considered of particular
relevance: r) identification and use of FIFA's leverage on relevant
actors in Qatar; z) the Human Rights Policy emanating from Article 3
of the 2016 FIFA Statutes; 3) a robust process for monitoring labour
conditions; 4) mechanisms for workers' complaints and grievances; and
5) establishment of an oversight/advisory body.
Regarding the first point FIFA accepts its responsibility to mitigate
risks by aiming to build and exercise its leverage whenever possible
with all relevant actors in Qatar in order to ensure decent and safe
working conditions for the zozz World Cup.z' Additionally, they agree
that in the context of the bidding requirements for future editions of
the World Cup the approach should be based on strengthening the due
diligence process.T2 Thereto FIFA will follow guidance from the OECD
Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights. Furthermore, BWI and FIFA agree that it is essential to secure
human rights compliance of subcontractors throughout the supply
chain, which complexity increases for tiers three and four. With respect
to a robust process of monitoring labour conditions, parties, including
labour inspections at FIFA World Cup related project sites which will be
worked out in a separate Memorandum of Understanding between BWI
and FIFA.zs Parties also agreed that a BWI representative will become
a member of FIFA's Human Rights Advisory Board which will take up
its work in zotT and will issue recommendations to FIFA twice a year.74
Both parties will also engage with Qatar to improve the effectiveness
of grievance mechanisms for workers.Ts Lastly, BWI and FIFA agreed
7o Professor on Human Rights at the University of Zurich.
i' NCP Switzerland, Final Statement, z May zot7. P. g.
7" Ibid.
?3 Ibid. P.4.
?4 Ibid. p. s.
75 Ibid.
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to meet regularly, at least twice a year, to update each other about the
human rights situation in Qatar and to exchange ideas of cooperation
to contribute to ensuring decent work and safety in the workplace for
migrant workers until the completion of the zozz World Cup in Qatar.z0
TV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS _ SEIZING
THE MOMENT FOR CTIANGE THROUGH SOFT I-AW
The first thing I want to reflect on is the role of trade unions
in the transnational setting. Two of the three cases discussed in this
contribution were raised by trade unions. The case at the Swiss court
was initiated by the Dutch trade union FNV, the Bangladeshi Free
Trade Union Congress, and the Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers
Federation and the specific instance with the Swiss NCP was submitted
by the global union federation BWL The significance of this lies with the
fact that while migrant workers in Qatar were (and still are) not allowed
to organise themselves, they do find themselves represented by trade
unions. More importantly, in both cases the trade unions were accepted
as parties having an interest, even though they didn't represent the
migrant workers directly. Especially the specific instance with the Swiss
NCP indicates the added value of global union federations to interact
with organisations at transnational level. All though global union
federations still face many challenges,zz they do fill a representative
gap which is in any case better than having no representative body at
all. In particular in this situation both, the ITUC and BWI, have proven
their added value.
The second point I want to reflect on is the added value of quasi-
judicial procedures. The Swiss Court was very quick to dismiss the
case. One of the reasons was that it considered that the first claim
of Plaintiffs, i.e. to order FIFA to redress the ongoing human rights
violations by pressing the responsible Qatari authorities to abolish the
?6 Ibid.
77 Cf.: Miiller T., Platzer H.-W., and Riib S. Global Union Federations and the
Challenges of Globalisation. International Policy Analysis (zoro); and more generally
Fairbrother P., Hennebert M.-A. and L6vesque Ch. (eds.). Transnational Trade
Unionism. Building Union Power, Routledge (zorS).
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controversial Kafala system, could potentially be deemed unlawful.
As such the Swiss Court completely ignores the nowadays generally
accepted expectation of transnational organisations to identify, prevent
and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts and account for how
these impacts are addressed.z8 This is even expected where the MNE
itself has not contributed to the adverse impact, but when the impact is
nevertheless directly linked to the operations, products or services by a
business relationship.Te This is an expectation of business, including an
organisation like FIFA, and requires certain actions of the multinational
enterprise. With whom the MNE needs to engage exactly within the
country it is doing business is never defined. Moreover, this is open and
depends on the situation and the risks involved and what is needed to
prevent or mitigate the adverse impact. In the situation of FIFA it is
clear that with the award of the 2o22 World Cup to Qatar more migrant
workers are being subjected to a vulnerable situation of modern slavery
created by the Kafala system. Therefore it is expected of FIFA to engage
with whatever organisation 
- 
private or public 
- 
to prevent or mitigate
the adverse impact of awarding the eozz World Cup to Qatar.
For the Swiss Court this situation was apparently too vague to issue
a ruling on. This is clearly different with the other two procedures. Of
course the Article z6 Complaint differs from the outset in that it is
directly aimed at Qatar and the fact that Qatar is blamed for allegedly
failing to comply with its obligations under the ILO Conventions.
However, this Complaint and the Specific Instance with the Swiss NCP
have in common that they are based on a process of engagement. In the
Article z6 Complaint the ILO engaged with Qatar to identify and work
towards solutions to stop the infringements. The Swiss NCP offered
its good office to mediate between FIFA and BWI in order to reach
a mutually acceptable agreement. Both procedures involved several
meetings and exchanges of information as well as trust and commitment
between the two parties involved to reach an outcome for future and
ongoing change of conduct towards (more) compliant behaviour. Thus,
instead of a retrospective, single instance decision regarding a clear and
fixed rule (which is typical for a court ruling), these softer mechanisms
78 Par. to General Principles of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs.
zg Par. L2 General Principles of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs.
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accept compliance as a complex process that requires an organisation or
State to undertake meaningful activities that creatively, critically, and
continually, redress their performance and improve it.
Both soft law processes have resulted in an ongoing engagement
with Qatar and FIFA in order to create change. In these procedures
many changes have already been announced, some have already been
effected, some not yet and are merely promises for the moment. Some
issues have only been addressed and new laws and policies still need to
be developed. Nonetheless, a process has started that seems irreversible.
More particularly, Qatar has undertaken the first steps to abolish the
Kafala system and FIFA has adopted a Human Rights policy, including
a Human Rights Advisory Board, which applies also to its subsidiaries
and subcontractors.
A lot has happened since in 2o1o FIFA awarded the zozz World Cup
to Qatar. Regrettably, this includes an outrageous number of fatalities
among migrant workers. Nonetheless, some positive things have also
come from it which give hope for a better future of the migrant workers
in Qatar and for all (migrant) workers involved with the organisation
and construction of buildings and infrastructure for future FIFA World
Cups.
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